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WHAT JUSTICE POWELL AND ADAM SMITH
COULD HAVE TOLD THE CITIZENS UNITED
MAJORITY ABOUT OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
ROBERT L. KERR*
This article is based on my much briefer comments as a panelist
at the "Citizens United and the First Amendment" Symposium presented
by the First Amendment Law Review at the University of North Carolina
School of Law in October of 2010. In this fuller essay, I seek especially
to address concerns expressed by symposium participants Floyd Abrams
and James Bopp, respectively, on (1) how a political message like
Hillary: The Movie could ever not be protected expression, and (2) why
"liberals" are not more concerned about the argument that allowing
restrictions on the Citizens United association would have meant similar
restrictions on associations like the Sierra Club. I propose to address
those questions by considering them in terms of the bigger one they
avoid: Given that long before Citizens United' all individuals had the
right to make unlimited political expenditures,' as well as the right to do
the same as associations of individuals,4 if an organization like Citizens
United could not find support for its message via all that unlimited
spending, what then justifies allowing corporate managers to provide
their stockholders' money for such funding?
. Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Journalism and Mass
Communication.
1. HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United Prod. 2008).
2. Citizens United v. Fed, Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 47-48 (1976) (per curiam).
4. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985) (striking down limits on campaign expenditures by
political action committees); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 259-63 (1986) (holding that ideological corporations, formed to
disseminate political ideas rather than to amass capital, were not subject to federal
restrictions then in place on business corporations' use of treasury funds to make
expenditures in connection with candidate elections).
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I have a difficult time seeing that as a "liberal" question. It
strikes me quite simply as a stockholder or property-owner question, and
it offers the ultimate answer to those relatively lesser and indeed
misleading questions noted above. After all, if Citizens United had not
utilized contributions by business corporations out of what is actually
their stockholders' property, then none of us would have been at the
UNC symposium in the first place.5 The Federal Election Commission
could have never lifted a finger regarding Hillary: The Movie and it
could have aired immediately, as Citizens United ostensibly desired,
when its subject was still in the running to be the presidential candidate
of her party - instead of the entire matter being dragged out in the
courts for years. There quite simply would have been no First
Amendment case to be litigated.
Indeed, if we must consider this matter at all in terms of the
"liberal-conservative" dichotomy that dominates and distorts far too
much political discourse today, it seems that it would be the modem
conservative movement that should be more concerned over Citizens
United. If, as that movement has so often insisted in recent decades, it is
wrong for government bureaucrats to decide how to spend other people's
money, how can it be acceptable for corporate bureaucrats to decide how
to spend other people's money for political purposes - without their
permission and most likely without their knowledge? The latter do not
obtain the money in question via taxation, to be sure, but they also do not
obtain it for the purpose of political expenditures. Investors seek profits
with their stock purchases and can choose their own political
expenditures from those profits - expenditures which, again, could be
5. The fact that the non-profit corporation Citizens United accepted
contributions from business corporations meant that it did not qualify for the right to
make unlimited expenditures established in Massachusetts Citizens for Life for
ideological corporations. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263-64. The Court
stipulated that an ideological corporation is "not established by a business
corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such
entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of
direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace." Id. at 264. The
majority in Citizens United rejected the Citizens United organization's request that
the case be resolved by expanding the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exemption to
include ideological corporations, such as itself, that accept only a de minimis amount
of funding from business corporations. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S.
Ct. at 891-92 (2010); id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 936-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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made without limits individually and in associations long before Citizens
United.
This article will be devoted in large part to the group of 1980s
Supreme Court cases that quite clearly sought to fully protect from
restrictions unlimited political expenditures by individuals and by
individuals joined together for the same purpose - while barring
corporate managers from spending stockholders' money on political
candidates. As will be detailed, they establish those elements so
compellingly that they could well be called the "Other People's Money"
cases. In asserting the untenability of Justice Anthony Kennedy's
position in his Citizens United majority opinion, in which he all but
pretends those cases do not exist, I will draw upon work by Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. in those and related cases, as well as the seminal
marketplace economics of Adam Smith. I will also argue how any fair
reading of those cases and the doctrine they advanced must reject
Citizens United as incorrectly decided.
I come at this subject as a First Amendment historian and
theorist rather than as a lawyer. I have focused the greatest part of my
research over the past decade on what I considered - and still consider
- to be perhaps the most important question that is shaping the nature of
our democracy: "hat does it mean to decide that the First Amendment
blocks regulation of corporate political media spending? I had written
two books and half-a-dozen scholarly articles on that subject even before
the Citizens United ruling. My many years of focusing on it led me to see
the central question involved specifically in those terms - in terms of
regulation of corporate political media spending,7 rather than in terms of
the freedom of corporate "speech."
6. See infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of those
cases using those terms).
7. The term "corporate political media spending" is utilized to reference the
First Amendment category of corporate "expression" that seeks to influence political
outcomes or social climate. Despite the multitudinous forms such efforts may take,
the former term almost inarguably offers a more precise term than "corporate
speech," as it is often referenced. First of all, "corporate political media spending" is
more clearly distinguished from "commercial speech"- media efforts (corporate or
not) that promote products or services. Each category has generated a distinct body
of First Amendment law, and in that context, all corporate speech is not commercial.
Neither is all commercial speech corporate. Additionally, in literal meaning, a
corporation cannot of course actually "speak" in the way that human beings can,
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It is certainly possible to quibble with my framing of the
question. But if we look at the major cases on the matter at hand, we find
that what they focus on more truly than anything else is the degree to
which the First Amendment should or should not block regulation of
corporate political media spending. In the basic facts of each we find (1)
regulation targeting such spending and then (2) challenges to such
regulation on First Amendment grounds. The regulation of such spending
is something that our democracy began to consider justified - indeed
necessary to preserving the democracy - well more than a century ago.
The effort to employ the First Amendment to block such regulation
began much more recently, in the mid to late 1970s. I have characterized
that effort as "the corporate free-speech movement."8
Because my analysis led me to conclude and say in print for
some two years before Citizens United that the corporate free-speech
movement was nearer than ever to its biggest victories at the Supreme
Court, I was not very surprised at the ruling earlier this year. I expected
this Court to greatly expand First Amendment protection for corporate
political media spending. Yet, I was surprised at how far and how fast it
moved the Court's jurisprudence on the subject toward absolute
protection of such spending. That was because my work had led me to
given that it is an "artificial being . . . existing only in contemplation of law," as
Chief Justice John Marshall so succinctly put it in the majority opinion of the
seminal corporation case of U.S. law, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). It can only spend - pay someone to express messages on
its behalf (through the spending decisions of corporate management). Beyond that,
the use of the term "corporate speech" also represents an arguably disingenuous act
of rhetorical framing, creating the impression that something that does not in fact
actually exist is an everyday reality. Legal scholar Linda Berger has focused much
work on the way that the metaphors society and the legal system choose to focus
upon in regard to corporate spending demonstrate contrasts in understanding of the
corporate role in a democratic society and can even influence judicial outcomes. See
Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical
Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER
L. REV. 949 (2007); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking?
How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J.
Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004). Thus this article, for the most part,
forgoes the expression "corporate speech" in favor of the more terminologically
representative "corporate political media spending."
8. SEE ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT:
COGNITIVE FEUDALISM AND THE ENDANGERED MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 2 (2008).
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conclude that the body of enduring wisdom developed over time against
such absolute protection is simply too great- if we want to preserve a
democracy of the people. I did not think this Court would so totally and
casually shrug off all that - at least not all in one case, one that on the
part of the petitioners did not even actually raise the question of whether
it should.9
In the next section, I will focus on how theoretical work
grounded in marketplace economics indicates very clearly that First
Amendment protection for corporate political media spending diminishes
democratic participation in political processes. After that, I will proceed
with analysis grounded more squarely in case law and history. But I start
with theoretical analysis because advancing theoretical reasoning is at
the heart of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Citizens United, just
as it was at the heart of the opinion that Justice Kennedy relied upon so
extensively - Justice Powell's majority opinion in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti. 0 Justice Kennedy cited that 1978 opinion twenty-
four times in Citizens United, and without Bellotti, there could be no
Citizens United. Nevertheless, I will offer evidence of how solid a case
can be made that even Bellotti-author Justice Powell would not have
gone as far as the Citizens United majority.
Professor Gene Nichol, in his role of moderator of our UNC
panel, said at one point that it seemed to highlight a trend in which
journalists respect precedent and lawyers don't. For my part, I actually
haven't worked as a journalist in more than fifteen years, never took a
single journalism course in five years of graduate school (where my
research on this subject began), and I teach not journalism, but the law of
mass communication. So, I suspect the question of whether precedent
9. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the question of whether
"corporations' electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than
those of individuals" was "not included in the questions presented to us by the
litigants . . . ." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 931 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Citizens United raised only an as-
applied challenge to the regulation at issue (rather than the facial challenge the
majority considered), and "never sought a declaration that [the regulation] was
facially unconstitutional as to all corporations and unions; instead it argued only that
the statute could not be applied to it because it was 'funded overwhelmingly by
individuals."' Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 932.
10. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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should be respected or not is less a matter of journalists versus lawyers
than one of basic legal philosophy. Eric Jaffe, another symposium
participant, said that he doesn't respect precedent as much as he does
what is right. Although he and I disagree on the Citizens United decision,
I agree with him on that particular point. But I would propose that to that
end we must then ask whether we believe that precedent can represent a
collective assessment over time of broader societal judgments on "what
is right."
Certainly, history has shown us how such judgments can be
wrong, indeed very wrong, as in such infamous cases as those that held
African-Americans are not protected by the Constitution" and
established the separate-but-equal doctrine.12 In order to distinguish the
precedents swept away by Citizens United and provide justification for
asserting their rightness, I will begin the following discussion with what
marketplace-of-ideas theory suggests about those precedents, which the
Court has consistently grounded in such theory. I will seek to establish
that both the relevant precedents - and the broader, enduring
philosophic wisdom from which they are derived - demonstrate how
very wrongly Citizens United was decided. In that process, I will press
the case for seriously considering such accumulated wisdom from the
past in our quest to determine "what is right," as opposed to reinventing
that wheel anew each time out. Indeed, regard for the former would seem
more consistent with core traditional conservative principles.' 3 As Justice
William H. Rehnquist once wrote of the lessons of history in a First
Amendment case on corporate expression: "[I]n a democracy, the
economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson that our ancestors
learned long ago, and that our descendants will undoubtedly have to
relearn many years hence."1 4
11. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
12. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. See, e.g., PATRICK ALLITT, THE CONSERVATIVES: IDEAS AND
PERSONALITIES THROUGHOUT HISTORY 2 (2009) (asserting that "conservatism is,
first of all, an attitude to social and political change that looks for support to the
ideas, beliefs, and habits of the past and puts more faith in the lessons of history than
in the abstractions of political philosophy").
14. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Central Hudson ruling - in a
challenge brought by a utility corporation - struck down a state energy-
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WHAT ADAM SMITH TELLS Us ABOUT THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
To elaborate upon that, let me begin with what Adam Smith tells
us about the jurisprudence represented by the majority ruling in Citizens
United. In my 2008 book I characterized him as its patron saint.'s There
and elsewhere I have drawn extensively upon the work of the eighteenth-
century thinker best known for writing The Wealth of Nations.16 That
book's enduring influence for more than two centuries makes him hands-
down the consensus choice to be called the father of the economic
system now known as capitalism. And his work on the best way to
structure truly free economic markets, I have proposed, offers us guiding
principles for similarly structuring the marketplace of ideas.
But Smith's life stands in cautionary testament to the stunning
way that time reduces even the greatest historical figures to convenient
bits of shorthand. Today, what comes to mind most often when Smith is
mentioned is the "invisible hand." And that phrase has been endlessly
parroted out of context and out of proportion to render Smith in popular
imagery as something of a supernatural chamber-of-commerce publicist.
In that role, Smith serves as the ultimate talisman, one that can slap down
conservation regulation that banned advertising that promoted greater consumption
of electricity. Id. at 572. This case is generally considered more directly to be part of
the commercial-speech case law than the case law on corporate political media
spending. Yet it had some relevance for the latter, as Justice Stevens argued in a
concurring opinion. He characterized the regulated expression as corporate political
speech - rather than commercial - because the banned promotional advertising
very well could address crucial questions being considered by political leaders
during the energy crises of the period. Id. at 580-81 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Rehnquist's dissent more broadly asserted the theory that non-human entities such as
state-created monopoly utilities and other corporations are subject to government
regulations that human citizens are not - including regulations on otherwise
protected expression. See id. at 586, 588-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); See also
infra notes 123-26, 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Rehnquist's
extensive jurisprudence advancing that theory).
15. See KERR, supra note 8, at 115.
16. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1776).
17. See KERR, supra note 8, at 115-32. See generally Robert L. Kerr, Impartial
Spectator in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Principles of Adam Smith as an Ethical
Basis for Regulation of Corporate Speech, 79 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 394
(2002) (discussing Adam Smith's impact on the marketplace of ideas).
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any restrictions on business interests as unjustifiable interference.
Consider though that Smith mentioned his "invisible hand" concept only
one time in all of The Wealth of Nations and in quite qualified and
nuanced language in that instance. That's because in his most famous
book, as in his life, his concerns encompassed so much more than that
widely misinterpreted and misused phrase on the way that pursuit of self-
interest can contribute to the public good. Smith believed in free
markets, without question. But the understanding of a free market that he
articulated at great length was not at all one in which democratic
government would be denied any role in preventing more powerful
participants from unfairly dominating that market.
When Justice Powell authored the majority opinion in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, ruling that the spending of
company profits by corporate management on political media messages
was a form of expression constitutionally protected from government
regulation, he grounded his reasoning in "the role of the First
Amendment in . . . affording the public access to discussion, debate, and
the dissemination of information and ideas."' 9 The Supreme Court has
used such marketplace-of-ideas reasoning, more than any other
theoretical basis for guiding First Amendment jurisprudence, to advance
the concept "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market . ... " In articulating
that, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes also made clear how important it is
to understand law in that sort of theoretical context. "That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution," he said of his marketplace-of-ideas
concept.21 "It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if
not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge." 22
The linkage between application of theory and constitutional
jurisprudence was clear. Ideas have consequences. And so, also, does the
misunderstanding of ideas. My analysis leads me to conclude that
Bellotti and Citizens United both represent cases of the latter. And as the
18. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
19. Id. at 783.





central basis for that conclusion, I recommend the seminal marketplace
economics of Adam Smith. That is, Smith's concept of individuals
competing equally in a free market toward the greatest good for society
can be applied to the concept of ideas competing in a free market. His
fundamental principles enable us to consider the workings of the
marketplace of ideas in more practical terms beyond Justice Holmes'
famous metaphor. Smith's basic principles cannot only be successfully
translated from the economic marketplace to the marketplace of ideas,
they provide compelling language for communicating their relevance in
terms of law and public policy. Time has shown that the basic concepts
Smith laid out remain fundamentally sound more than two centuries
later. Smith offers us the foundation upon which dominant economic
thought on free markets continues to be analyzed and debated. As
historian Jeffrey Collins wrote last year in reviewing a new biography of
Smith, the teachings of The Wealth of Nations "are so fundamental to
modem economics that familiarity often dulls our appreciation of its
brilliance.",2 3
As a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University in the
second half of the eighteenth century, Adam Smith lectured in theology,
ethics, and jurisprudence. He became famous with the 1759 publication
of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he focused on ethical
theory.24 In An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, published in 1776, Smith advanced his economic theories. 2 5 The
whole of his analysis comprises inquiries not only into the economic
wealth of the nation, but also into both "the well-being of society as a
whole and for the freedom of the individual[s] within that society." 2 6 In
most basic terms, Smith called for limiting government in order to allow
23. See Jeffrey Collins, A Wealth of Ideas, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at A23
(discussing Smith's work in a review of NICHOLAS PHILLIPSON, ADAM SMITH: AN
ENLIGHTENED LIFE (2010)).
24. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Liberty Classics,
1981) (1759).
25. See SMITH, supra note 16.
26. ROBERT FALKNER, A CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIST? THE POLITICAL
LIBERALISM OF ADAM SMITH REVISITED 5 (1997); see also ROBERT BOYDEN LAMB,
PROPERTY MARKETS AND THE STATE IN ADAM SMITH'S SYSTEM 431-33 (1987)
(summarizing the author's view that Adam Smith's ultimate goal was "the
improvement of men and government").
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the motivation of self-interest to flourish and generate material benefits
for society - because that advanced the utilitarian value of the common
good, Smith's ultimate concern. However, he also emphasized that a
system of justice was essential to protect all members of society as well
as possible - including protecting free markets from domination by the
most powerful business interests.
Since his death, however, many economics texts have tended to
"distort[] both Smith's moral theory and his economics," as Smith
scholar John E. Hill has written. 2 7 "These texts emphasized laissez-faire,
a word Smith did not use - it never appears even once in Wealth of
Nations - and competitive individualism, at the cost of the benevolence
and justice which Smith emphasized." 2 8 His work reflected a much
broader, more humane subject than economics as generally taught in
universities today. "Smith's modem followers tend to be economists
without a strong sense of civic life, and so that is how his admirers and
detractors see Smith himself," in the assessment of economist Athol
29
Fitzgibbons. Indeed, too many of both followers and admirers today
tend to imagine Smith as some sort of philosophical forerunner of
Gordon Gekko, the unapologetic inside trader from Oliver Stone's 1987
film Wall Street3o and the 2010 sequel Wall Street: Money Never
Sleeps.31 Yet, "[t]here is nothing in Smith's work that would even for a
27. JOHN E. HILL, REVOLUTIONARY VALUES FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM: JOHN
ADAMS, ADAM SMITH, AND SOCIAL VIRTUE 140 (2000).
28. See Kerr, Impartial Spectator, supra note 17; see also HILL, supra note 27,
at ix (expounding on Smith's "concept of political balance among economic classes"
and his "criticisms of excessive individualism" with the goal of dispelling commonly
held misconceptions of Smith and his values); ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE
PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS
TRIUMPH 109-10 (1997) (explaining the way in which Smith combined what other
thinkers viewed as mankind's drive to economic advantage and the "consideration
on the part of others" by concluding that, for Smith, achieving the latter meant also
achieving the former and so the two were really one concept for him).
29. See ATHOL FITZGIBBONS, ADAM SMITH'S SYSTEM OF LIBERTY, WEALTH,
AND VIRTUE: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 22 (1995).
30. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
31. WALL STREET: MONEY NEVER SLEEPS (20th Century Fox 2010).
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moment suggest that 'greed is good,"' Solomon points out, referencing
Gekko's most famous line. 32
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Bellotti similarly contradicts
Smith's free-market principles. In essence, Justice Powell's reasoning
went, opening up the marketplace of ideas to more corporate political
media spending would advance the First Amendment role of making that
market freer and providing more ideas and information to political debate
on public issues. However, Smith's principles highlight how First
Amendment protection for corporate media spending actually provides a
conduit for the transfer of the corporation's government-provided
advantages from the economic market directly to the marketplace of
ideas - a concept crucial to shaping the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on corporate political media spending in most of the related cases
between Bellotti and Citizens United. Smith's concepts do emphasize
openness and similar opportunities for all competitors in the economic
marketplace. Yet rather than laissez-faire economics, he stressed that the
efforts of the most powerful competitors can be expected to work against
maintaining freedom of competition in the marketplace. "The interest of
the dealers . . .. in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is
always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the
publick," he wrote.33 "To widen the market and to narrow the
competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market
may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the publick; but to
narrow the competition must always be against it . ... Further, he
declared, "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices."3 5
So just as strongly as Smith cautioned against dominance of the
marketplace by government, he warned also about the same by powerful
business interests, which he characterized as "an order of men, whose
interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who
32. Kerr, supra note 17 (quoting ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND
EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY 85 (1992)).
33. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 157.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 129.
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accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed
it."36 Smith called not for rejecting all government regulation but more
precisely for rejecting the sort that was dominant at the time he was
writing The Wealth of Nations in mid eighteenth-century England. In
particular, he argued against then common mercantilist policies of
sanctioning monopolies, putting quotas on imports, heavily regulating
activities of individual tradesmen, and restricting other such aspects of
economic behavior. Smith called for abandoning all such policies that
privileged the few at the expense of the many and prevented most from
competing fairly in a free market. The Wealth of Nations was published
the same year that American revolutionaries declared independence and
was highly influential among the founders.
Smith supported regulation that served to resist the narrowing of
the marketplace, particularly a system of justice that emphasized liberty,
competition, and fair play. In The Wealth of Nations, he wrote that
government is responsible for "protecting, as far as possible, every
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other
member of it . ..39 Indeed, when considered in this broader context of
Smith's work, his invisible-hand concept is more accurately understood
not as an independent force but as a dependent variable - one that must
40
be protected by government in order for it to function effectively.
36. See id. at 157; see also G.R. Bassiry & Marc Jones, Adam Smith and the
Ethics of Contemporary Capitalism, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 621, 621 (1993) (arguing that
"[c]ontemporary capitalism, dominated as it is by large corporations, entrenched
political interests and persistent social pathologies, bears little resemblance to the
system which Smith envisioned would serve the common man").
37' See Denis Collins, Adam Smith's Social Contract: The Proper Role of
Individual Liberty and Government Intervention in Eighteenth Century Society, 7
Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 120, 121 (1988); see also John D. Bishop, Adam Smith's
Invisible Hand Argument, 14 J. Bus. ETHICS 165, 173 (1995) (discussing Smith's
criticism of merchants pursuing regulation instead of a free market place).
38 See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE
REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s 26 (1984) (discussing the impact Smith's Wealth
ofNations had on Americans since it was published).
39. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 392.
40. See, e.g., JERRY Z. MULLER, ADAM SMITH IN His TIME AND OURS:
DESIGNING THE DECENT SOCIETY 19 (1993) (discussing how the markets were set to
promote the well-being of society and how government must interfere to protect the
public). PATRICIA H. WERHANE, ADAM SMITH AND His LEGACY FOR MODERN
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Among the key areas in which Smith advocated strong roles for
government were in maintaining national defense, law enforcement, and
a judicial system; protecting copyrights and patents; enforcing contracts;
regulating mortgages; controlling paper money and the banking system;
administering taxation necessary to fund required services; enforcing
limits on interest rates to protect consumers; overriding free trade when
foreign-policy measures necessitated it; funding public-works projects
such as roads, canals, bridges and harbors; and providing broad public
education. Certainly such expansive involvement of government in so
many areas of life is at odds with a laissez-faire approach to social
organization, as well as so many popular representations of Smith's
ideas. But community-oriented concerns are prominent throughout
Smith's work. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he articulated at
length his concept of the "impartial spectator." 4 1 That was the name
Smith gave to the instinct that "whenever we are about to act so as to
affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of
astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one
of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it . . . . "42 It is the
"impartial spectator" who "shows us the propriety of generosity and the
deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of
our own, for the yet greater interests of others . . . . "43
This concept is crucial to Smith's concept of justice advancing
the common good, which is equally central to both The Theory of Moral
Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. Indeed, the two works treat
essentially the same topics in different realms - the former's
examination of the basis for morals and legislation is extended to form
the ethical foundation for the latter's focus on political and economic
spheres. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, for example, Smith called
the pursuit of wealth illusory but useful. 44 "If we consider the real
satisfaction which all these things are capable of affording . . . . it will
always appear in the highest degree contemptible and trifling," he said.45
CAPITALISM 109-10 (1991) (discussing how the market is composed of various
dependent variables).
41. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 137.
42. Id
43. Id.
44. See id at 181.
45. Id. at 183.
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The pleasures of wealth and greatness . . . strike the
imagination as something grand, and beautiful, and
noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil
and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow on it. And it
is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is
this deception which rouses and keeps in continual
motion the industry of mankind.46
Then in The Wealth of Nations, he similarly grounded his
concept of limited government encouraging individual self-interest to
flourish in the relentless passion of humans for
bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally
calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb,
and never leaves us till we go in the grave.... In the
whole interval which separates those two moments,
there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any man
is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his
situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or
improvement, of any kind.47
Bottom line, Smith called for channeling the relentless human
impulse for personal gain so as to maximize the common good - not for
letting that impulse run rampant, regardless of the societal cost.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith wrote that a
competitor
may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and
every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But
if he should jostle, or throw down any of them, the
indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a
violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of.4 8
That assertion is consistent with his emphasis in The Wealth of
Nations on government's responsibility for "protecting, as far as
possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of
every other member of it." 49 When corporate managers are allowed to
participate in candidate elections through deployment of their corporate
46. Id.
47. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 203.
48. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 83.
49. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 392.
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treasuries, it represents just such a "violation of fair play., 50 Providing
First Amendment protection for such spending of stockholders' money
allows corporate managers to wield the special, wealth-generating
advantages (perpetual life, limited liability, and tax treatment) that are
granted by government to the corporate form - but not to individuals. In
that manner, managers are permitted to transfer those advantages from
the economic marketplace directly over to the political marketplace,
diminishing true free trade in ideas because other participants are not
provided with such significant advantages.
I wrote in 2007 that the future of First Amendment jurisprudence
on corporate political media spending would be crucially shaped by the
Court's choice between the laissez-faire and the Adam Smith
understandings of the marketplace of ideas. Over the course of the
years following Bellotti, we saw significant holdings by majorities at the
Court trending toward the latter understanding. But with the death of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 2005 and the retirement of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor in 2006 (both of whom were part of the six-three
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce52 majority), the trend
reversed. For the majority in Citizens United, the holding in Austin in
particular "interferes with the 'open marketplace' of ideas protected by
50. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 83.
51. See Robert L. Kerr, Justifying Corporate-Speech Regulation Through a
Town-Meeting Understanding of the Marketplace of Ideas, 9 JOURNALISM & COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 57, 96 (2007) (conceptualizing through the work of Smith and First
Amendment philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn a town-meeting understanding of
the marketplace of ideas that rejects the sort of government advantaging of corporate
participants represented by First Amendment protection for corporate political media
spending). Meiklejohn's work was cited by Justice Powell as central to his
theoretical basis in Bellotti. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
791 (1978) (citing Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 263 (1961)); see also Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and
Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1234-36 (1986) (discussing the Bellotti Court's use of
Meiklejohn as its deus et machina to overcome the "apparent incongruities" of
extending First Amendment protection to non-human entities such as business
corporations).
52 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010)).
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the First Amendment., 5 3 In rejecting Austin's structural mechanism for
preventing deployment of "'resources amassed in the economic
marketplace"' through state-created benefits of the corporate form to
obtain "'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace,"' 5 4 Citizens
United advances an understanding of a laissez-faire marketplace of ideas.
The Citizens United majority, however, not only diverged from an
understanding of marketplace freedom that Adam Smith would endorse,
it probably moved even beyond what Justice Powell could accept.
HOW THE ACTUAL A USTIN CONTRADICTS THE CITIZENS UNITED VERSION
OF A USTIN
In the course of overruling Austin,55 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion insists that "before Austin, the Court had not allowed the
,,56
exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public dialogue. it
concedes that Bellotti "did not address the constitutionality of the State's
ban on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates. In our
view, however, that restriction would have been unconstitutional under
Bellotti's central principle: that the First Amendment does not allow
political speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity."57
With that, Justice Kennedy begins a process more grounded in his
hypothesizing about how earlier Courts would have ruled on that matter
than in how they actually did. He proceeds as if there were no related
cases between Bellotti and Austin, stating immediately after that
discussion of Bellotti: "Thus the law stood until Austin." After briefly
summarizing the facts involved in Austin, he declares that it "identified a
new governmental interest" in "preventing 'the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
53. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , _, 130 S. Ct.
876, 906 (2010) (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196,
208 (2008)).
54 Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990)).
55. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
56. Id at 130 S. Ct. at 899.
57. Id at _, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
58. Id
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help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas."' 5 9
From there, Justice Kennedy proceeds to deliver what can be
read as evidence of imposing an artificial baseline similar to that which
Cass Sunstein's influential analysis asserts as the ultimate error of
Lochner v. New York. "This Court is confronted with conflicting lines
of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on
the speaker's corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them,"
in Justice Kennedy's version of the case law.61 There and elsewhere in
his opinion, Justice Kennedy presents his analysis as grounded in a
baseline that he maintains as natural and pre-political, resonating of the
error that Sunstein characterized as Lochner's ultimate illegitimacy.6
Rather than critiquing Lochner simply in terms of judicial activism,
Sunstein's oft-cited analysis articulates it in terms of the Court treating
market ordering under the common law as part of nature rather than a
legal construct, which led it to impose as pre-political an artificial
baseline from which to measure the constitutionality of government
59. Id. Justice Kennedy describes that interest by employing a term that does
not actually appear anywhere in the Austin opinion: "an antidistortion interest." Id.
60. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 883; Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905) (striking down a New York regulation limiting to
sixty the number of hours that bakery employees could be required to work in a
week). Lochner provided broad precedent for invalidating other regulation of
business until it was rejected by the Court in 1937. See West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-94 (1937); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) (discussing the baseline analysis of
Lochner). This article has been called "by far the most influential revisionist work on
Lochner" and "one of the most influential constitutional law articles," of recent
decades, having been cited in law reviews hundreds of times, far more often than any
other assessment of Lochner. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's
Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2003) (discussing how the article's impact
extends to the way its themes have been developed in many of Sunstein's other well-
cited articles and books (particularly Cass R. Sunstein's The Partial Constitution),
which have also been widely cited and taught in law schools and have influenced the
work of many scholars, as well as several Supreme Court justices).
61. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 883.
62. See generally Robert L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating
Lochner's Error in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. &
POL'Y 153 (2010) (discussing the Citizen United Court's mistake of repeating the
same error from Lochner).
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regulation. His analysis concluded that "[a]bove all, the [Lochner]
Court's concern was that" the bakery regulations were "partisan rather
than neutral," and "[i]t was neutrality that the due process clause
commanded."6" Reasoning that "neutrality was served only by the
general or 'public' purposes comprehended by the police power" and
concluding that the regulation could not be "justified as a labor or health
law . . . it was invalidated as impermissibly partisan." 6 5 Thus, the
Lochner majority's framework conceptualized common-law categories
that "were taken as a natural rather than social construct. The status of
the common law as a part of nature undergirded the view that the
common law should form the baseline from which to measure deviations
from neutrality ..... "66
Because the Court in that manner deemed the bakery regulations
to represent impermissible interference with the existing distribution of
wealth, Sunstein concluded: "Market ordering under the common law
was understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it
formed the baseline from which to measure the constitutionally critical
lines that distinguished action from inaction and neutrality from
impermissible partisanship."67 When the Court three decades later
signaled its abandonment of Lochner in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,68 it adopted an "understanding that in any case, government -
through minimum wage laws or the common law system - is making a
choice." 6 9 In Sunstein's analysis, that Court acknowledged its chosen
baseline was "a system in which all workers had a living wage" that
rejected Lochner's dogma that it was "natural and inviolate" to adhere to
"a system that was legally constructed and took the status quo as the
foundation from which to measure neutrality." 70
My analysis finds considerable evidence that Justice Kennedy's
Citizens United opinion similarly advances as natural and inviolate what
63. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 874.
64. Id. at 878.
65. Id. at 878-79.
66. Id. at 879.
67. Id. at 874 (declaring that understanding to be "faithful to what the Court
said when it both engaged in and abandoned Lochner-like reasoning").
68. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
69. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 881.
70. Id. at 881-82.
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are actually no more than legal constructs of considerable artifice,
particularly in the way it characterizes Austin as some sort of doctrinal
island with no precursor in the case law. In order to maintain such a
pretense, one must ignore the group of highly significant cases on
corporate political media spending from the 1980s in which the Court
built the foundation for Austin by walling off spending in candidate
elections from corporate treasuries advantaged by the special, state-
created protections of perpetual life, limited liability, and tax advantages.
And that foundation was even more deeply grounded in the priorities of
more than a century of legislative and judicial judgment. Through that
process - with key support from justices in the Bellotti majority - the
Court established a carefully balanced doctrine that fully protected
political expression and unlimited political expenditures not only by
individuals but also by associations of individuals who wished to engage
in such expression through similarly unlimited media spending via
political action committees or ideological corporations. Thus, the
argument that without Citizens United, the First Amendment rights of
associations of individuals would be limited pretends that those rights
were not already fully protected by the 1980s rulings on the subject -
the cases I suggest can be called the "Other People's Money" cases. But
as in Justice Kennedy's Citizens United opinion, that pretense is
necessary in order to avoid spotlighting what Citizens United actually
protected - the right of corporate management to spend stockholder's
money on political candidates - rather than leaving the choice on such
expenditures of their money to the stockholders. Protecting the right to
thus spend other people's money effectively dismantled a doctrine that
maximized political expressive freedom by individuals and associations
of individuals and minimized encroachment upon that freedom by
structurally advantaged corporate spending of other people's money.
In skipping directly from Bellotti to Austin in his central
discussion of the relevant case law on corporate political media
spending, Kennedy first omitted Federal Election Commission v.
National Right to Work Committee.7 1 In that 1982 case, the Court had
71 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 909 (2010)
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unanimously upheld 72 a section of the Federal Election Campaign Act
that prohibited corporations or labor unions from soliciting contributions
for separate segregated funds (political action committees) from sources
outside a committee's legally allowable membership.7 3 The Court
accepted the government's argument that Congress had acted to prevent
corporations from using their general treasury funds to influence federal
elections "only after it became aware of widespread abuses which were
thought to present imminent danger of corruption of the federal election
process, resulting in a decline of public confidence in the integrity of
elected officials and the fair operation of government." 7 4
The government successfully argued that it had a compelling
interest in ensuring that the "substantial aggregations of wealth"76
accumulated through the special legal advantages granted the corporate
formn would not be converted into political "war chests"7 - the
deployment of which could incur political debts from candidates in
elections, as the Court had established in 1957 in United States v. United
Auto Workers.7 9 The government also emphasized that the holdings in
Buckley v. Valeo and Bellotti as well had supported that interest as "of
the highest order." 8 2 Asserting the further interest of protecting
individuals who invested in a corporation for economic purposes from
72 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'1 Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
211 (1982).
73. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006) declared unconstitutional by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
74. Brief for Petitioners at 18, Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (No. 81-1506).
75 Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 208 ("We agree with petitioners
that these purposes are sufficient to justify the regulation at issue.").
76. Id. at 207.
77. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
78. Nat ' Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 207.
79. 352 U.S. 567, 579 (1957) (quoting Representative Gerald W. Landis'
testimony before a congressional hearing, To Regulate Labor Organizations:
Hearing on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 78th Cong., I st
Sess. 1, 2, 4 (1943)).
80. 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curium).
81. 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978). The Court noted that while "[t]he importance
of the governmental interest in preventing [the creation of political debts] has never
been doubted. The case before us presents no comparable problem." Id. at 788 n.26.
82. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 74, at 18.
having their money used for political purposes, the government cited
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, which was
decided more than a quarter century before. 84 In accepting that the
asserted interests were compelling and thus outweighed the First
85
Amendment rights asserted by the National Right to Work Committee,
the unanimous Court declared: "The governmental interest in preventing
both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption of elected
representatives has long been recognized and there is no reason why it
may not in this case be accomplished by treating unions, corporations,
and similar organizations differently from individuals."86 The emphasis
on preventing both real and apparent corruption drew upon Buckley's
assertion that the latter was "[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of
actual quid pro quo arrangements" because of its potential eroding
. 87
impact on confidence and participation in political processes. It also
should be noted that Justice Powell, the author of Bellotti, joined the
opinion in full, and no justices wrote separately to qualify or challenge
the majority opinion in any way. Indeed all four of the justices from the
Bellotti majority still on the Court - Justices Burger, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Powell (the fifth, Potter Stewart, having retired the year
before) -joined the National Right to Work Committee holding.
Thus, National Right to Work Committee - and the body of case
law it reaffirmed - glaringly contradicts Justice Kennedy's Citizens
United assertions that "Bellotti's central principle" means "the First
Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a
speaker's corporate identity" and that Austin "identified a new
governmental interest" in "preventing 'the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
83. 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
84. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 74, at 18.
85. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207
(1982).
86. Id. at 2 10-11 (citation omitted).
87. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 2 (1976) (quoting United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
88. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
876, 903 (2010).
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help of the corporate form."' 89 Most strikingly, eight years before Austin,
the author of Bellotti and the remainder of his Bellotti majority accepted
just such restrictions in National Right to Work Committee. In doing so, a
unanimous Court in 1982 recognized as long established the interest that
Justice Kennedy twenty-eight years later represented as having been
"new" in 1990's Austin.
Then 1985's Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee,90 in striking down limits on
campaign expenditures by political action committees,91 declared that it
did so because such expenditures did not represent the same threat of real
89. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
660 (1990)). Several pages later, in a separate subsection, Justice Kennedy does
acknowledge that "NR WC did say there is a 'sufficient' governmental interest in
'ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed' by corporations would
not 'be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the
contributions."' Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (quoting Nat'l Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. at 207-208 (1982)). He also concedes that "NRWC suggested a
governmental interest in restricting 'the influence of political war chests funneled
through the corporate form,"' but then insists the case "has little relevance here"
because it "decided no more than that a restriction on a corporation's ability to solicit
funds for its segregated PAC, which made direct contributions to candidates, did not
violate the First Amendment." Id. (citing Nat'1 Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at
206). Therefore, he concludes, National Right to Work Committee is not relevant to
Citizens United because the latter involved corporate expenditures rather than
contributions. Id. But he makes no attempt to reconcile National Right to Work
Committee's holdings with his sweeping statements - upon which his central
analysis is based - that "before Austin, the Court had not allowed the exclusion of a
class of speakers from the general public dialogue" and that Austin "identified a new
governmental interest." Id. at , _, 130 S. Ct. at 899, 903. Thus Justice Kennedy
seems to maintain that when a majority opinion - even a unanimous one - states
that there are well established and legitimate interests in preventing the corrupting
influence of advantaged corporate wealth being converted from the economic market
to the marketplace of ideas, then it somehow means those interests only exist in
relation to such transfers made via PAC funds and not directly from corporate
treasuries.
90. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
91. Id. at 501. At issue was a section of the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (2006), that made it a criminal offense for an
independent political committee to expend more than $1,000 to further the election
of a presidential candidate who had elected to accept public financing. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 9012(f) (2006); Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 491-92.
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or apparent corruption as those of business corporations. It emphasized
that the speech interests of individuals joined together for the purpose of
expressing viewpoints were protected and distinguished from the
economic interests represented by funds accumulated in corporate
treasuries through the special advantages of the business corporate
form.93 A year after that, in Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,94 the Court still again distinguished
spending made directly via such treasuries as fundamentally different
from human First Amendment expression in holding that regulations of
independent political expenditures applied to ideological corporations
(rather than business corporations) were unconstitutional." The
economic advantages provided to the business corporate form can create
"an unfair advantage in the political marketplace," the Court declared,
because the "resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are
not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas.
They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors
and customers." 96 Massachusetts Citizens for Life established a three-part
test to distinguish between the two types of corporations, a test that
critically emphasized why such ideological corporations could not accept
contributions from business corporations - so as to prevent the former
from serving as conduits into the political marketplace for spending from
the latter.97
92. Nat'1 Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97, 500-01.
93. Id. at 500.
94. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
95. Id. at 259-63.
96. Id. at 257-58.
97. Id. at 263-264. The ruling established a three-part test to distinguish
between the two types of corporations:
In particular, MCFL has three features essential to our holding
that it may not constitutionally be bound by § 441b's
restriction on independent spending. First, it was formed for
the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot
engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are
expressly denominated as requests for contributions that will
be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures,
these events cannot be considered business activities. This
ensures that political resources reflect political support.
Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as
to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that
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Thus it could be argued as anticlimactic - rather than "new" -
four years later, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, when the
majority once again recognized interests already established as
compelling in National Right to Work Committee and Massachusetts
Citizens For Life.98 For its holdings reflected a doctrine clearly
articulated by the Court over the previous decade in the "Other People's
Money" cases. By walling off spending from corporate treasuries
advantaged by special, state-created protections (perpetual life, limited
liability, and tax advantages), the Court had reached a carefully balanced
doctrine that fully protected political expression and unlimited political
expenditures by any human individual, as well as that of any association
of such individuals who wished to engage in such expression collectively
through the similarly unlimited media spending of political action
committees or ideological corporations. That doctrine arguably
represented as close to as nearly perfect a balance as possible between
maximizing human political expressive freedom and minimizing
encroachment upon that freedom by structurally advantaged corporate
spending - a balance that preserved the priorities of more than a century
of legislative and judicial judgment.
WOULD EVEN BELLOTTI AUTHOR POWELL HAVE JOINED CITIZENS
UNITED?
The enduring wisdom in maintaining such a delicate but
equitable balance in this infinitely complex area of law is most
convincingly demonstrated by the fact that Justice Powell, the author of
persons connected with the organization will have no
economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they
disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not
established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is
its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This
prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the
type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political
marketplace.
Id.
98. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60
(1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010).
the Bellotti opinion in which Justice Kennedy's Citizens United ruling
purports to be grounded so solidly, joined the majorities in all three of
the cases that established the foundation for 1990's Austin ruling. Justice
Powell's participation in Massachusetts Citizens for Life is particularly
revealing in that it offers indications on just how likely it appears he
would have disagreed with Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the case
law on corporate political media spending between Bellotti and Austin.
Although Justice Powell believed corporate spending of the type at issue
in Bellotti (on referenda) should be protected by the First Amendment,
his private papers indicate he was comfortable with the pre-Austin line of
cases restricting such spending that involved candidate elections to
political action committees.
For Justice Kennedy, the regulations on corporate political media
spending represent "a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact
that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak" because a political
action committee "is a separate association from the corporation. So the
PAC exemption . . . does not allow corporations to speak." 99
Additionally, he writes in Citizens United that political action
committees "are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to
administer and subject to extensive regulations."' 00 Yet former corporate
attorney Justice Powell, who also had some experience in electoral
politics in Virginia before joining the Court, in the deliberations on
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, expressed no disagreement with
regulations limiting corporate spending in candidate campaigns to funds
raised through political action committees - rather than directly from
corporate treasuries. In a memorandum dictated for his files "to refresh
my recollection as to the issues," he wrote that if the corporation before
the Court "had created a separate segregated fund, derived from
contributions of subs[c]ribers or sympathizers, that fund could be used
without limit to publish the corporation's views in support of, or in
99. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
876, 897 (2010).
100. Id.
101. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 124-25 (1994).
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opposition to, any candidate. Thus, the burdening of First Amendment
rights is - at most - quite limited ... 102
Justice Powell also expressed acceptance for broader principles
justifying regulation of at least some corporate political media spending,
writing "Yes"1 03 in the margin of his clerk's bench memorandum next to
the statement: "There is a strong argument that unlimited expenditures by
large corporations [in candidate elections] could indeed pose the danger
of corruption." 10 4 In another memorandum two months later, his clerk
detailed guidelines that the public-interest group Common Cause
proposed in an amicus brief for distinguishing between business
corporations and ideological corporations, guidelines that focused on
walling off the latter from financial support or influence by the former. 05
In the margin next to that passage, Justice Powell bracketed the
guidelines and wrote, "Seems reasonable." Indeed, the three-part test
that the Court went on to establish for that purpose contained essentially
the same elements as those proposed by Common Cause. o7
Most significantly, after the first draft of the majority opinion by
Justice William J. Brennan's opinion was circulated, a memorandum on
it by Justice Powell's clerk emphasized for him that
[t]he major question for you is whether you agree with
the principle set out... that organizations are properly
subject to the requirement that they form a PAC when
there is a danger that they will use funds gained from the
economic arena to engage in speech in the political
102. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Case File
No. 85-701, at 5 (Aug. 11, 1986) (on file with First Amendment Law Review and
Washington & Lee University School of Law).
103. Bench Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Case
File No. 85-701, at 21 (Aug. 19, 1986) (on file with First Amendment Law Review
and Washington & Lee University School of Law) (emphasis omitted).
104. Id.
105. Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Case File
No. 85-701, at 6 (Oct. 9, 1986) (on file with First Amendment Law Review and
Washington & Lee University School of Law).
106. Id. (referring to notes in margin of memorandum).
107. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
263-64 (1986); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life test).
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arena.... This would seem to be the principle from this
opinion that will be applied to later opinions.'os
Justice Powell's papers offer one example after another of how
actively he would lobby justices in the process of authoring majority
opinions with which he had concerns and often seek changes
accordingly. Yet even after reviewing his clerk's prescient and
unequivocal memorandum on what Massachusetts Citizens for Life
would mean for the direction of case law, Justice Powell made no
requests for revisions in joining Justice Brennan's majority opinion.' 09
And that occurred the same year that Justice Powell aggressively worked
to forge a narrow majority for protecting corporate expression from
being compelled to associate with the viewpoints of other speakers in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California. 0 Thus even though Justice Powell continued to assert a
degree of First Amendment protection for corporate political media
spending in 1986, he also accepted with no evident disagreement the
proposition that corporations "are properly subject to the requirement
that they form a PAC when there is a danger that they will use funds
gained from the economic arena to engage in speech in the political
arena."
We cannot, of course, know with certainty how Justice Powell
would have voted if he had still been on the Court when it considered
Austin four years after Massachusetts Citizens for Life.112 We can,
however, know how the majorities of justices who were on the Court in
1990 did decide the questions concerning regulation of corporate
expenditures in candidate elections in Austin and in the preceding "Other
108. Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Case File
No. 85-701, at 2 (Nov. 6, 1986) (on file with First Amendment Law Review and
Washington & Lee University School of Law).
109. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Supreme Court Case File No. 85-701, at 1 (Nov. 10, 1986) (on file with First
Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee University School of Law).
110. 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986). The case posed the question of whether parties
with different views should be allowed to include political inserts in billing
envelopes containing such inserts from a utility corporation, as the state's Public
Utility Commission had ruled and the California Supreme Court had allowed to
stand. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 4-7.
111. Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 108.
112. Justice Powell retired from the Supreme Court in 1987 and died in 1998.
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People's Money" cases that provided the solid set of holdings
establishing its foundation (all holdings, to re-emphasize, that Bellotti
author Justice Powell joined). In contrast, Justice Kennedy's Citizens
United opinion relies less on what those majorities decided than on a
hypothesis based on his reading of Buckley and Bellotti. Regarding the
former, he declares that although it "did not consider a separate ban on
corporate and union independent expenditures . . . " had such
expenditures "been challenged in Buckley's wake . . . it could not have
been squared with the precedent's reasoning and analysis."13
Justice John Paul Stevens points to the incongruity of that
analysis in his dissent:
In the [Citizens United] Court's view, Buckley and
Bellotti decisively rejected the possibility of
distinguishing corporations from natural persons in the
1970's; it just so happens that in every single case in
which the Court has reviewed campaign finance
legislation in the decades since, the majority failed to
grasp this truth. The Federal Congress and dozens of state
legislatures, we now know, have been similarly
deluded.114
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's creative assessment of the case
law leads him to insist there was one inevitable result in Citizens United:
"Austin should be and now is overruled. We return to the principle
established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity., 1 15
HOW THE BELLO7T COURT UNDERSTOOD BELLOT77I
As with the cases between Bellotti and Austin, however, my
analysis also suggests that Justice Kennedy greatly mischaracterizes
Bellotti in representing it as a sweeping holding so deeply grounded in
well established precedent that the Citizens United majority simply had
113. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
876, 883 (2010) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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to dismiss more recent holdings on corporate political media spending.
That is contradicted by considerable evidence as to how Bellotti was
understood by the justices who participated in it - including its author
and driving force, Justice Powell.
For example, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy cites Bellotti
as authority for flatly declaring: "The Court has recognized that First
Amendment protection extends to corporations."" 6 The Bellotti opinion,
however, declared up front that it would not consider the question of
"whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment rights"
because that was the "wrong question."" 7 Indeed, it emphasized that its
ruling would not even consider anything so sweeping as "the abstract
question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that
individuals enjoy under the First Amendment."" 8 Justice Powell's
opinion maintained that the "question must be whether" Massachusetts'
ban on corporate spending to influence referendum questions that did not
materially affect corporate interests "abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect," and then proceeded to conclude:
"We hold that it does."ll 9
And even that holding, such as it was, broke considerable
precedential ground for many, if not virtually all, of the Justices who
participated in the decision. That was particularly true with Justice
Rehnquist who, like Justice Powell, had been nominated to the Court by
President Richard Nixon to push the Court in a more conservative
direction.120 Nine days before the Bellotti ruling was handed down,
116. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
117. 435 U.S. 765, 775-76 (1978).
118. Id. at 777.
119. Id. at 776.
120. Between mid-1969 and the beginning of 1972, Nixon appointed Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. See, e.g., JEFFRIES,
supra note 101, at 253.
[O]n the crucial issues, the Nixon Justices could be expected,
more often than not, to end up on the same side. Each of them
was more conservative than any of the holdovers from the Warren
Court. Together they formed a bloc of four, loosely united by
outlook and sympathy, and - apparently - poised under the




Justice Powell conceded to Justice Rehnquist that no previous case truly
had gone as far as his opinion would: "[N]o prior decision has expressly
recognized corporate speech generally as explicitly as my opinion
does.""2 Still lobbying Justice Rehnquist in hopes of expanding the
majority for his opinion beyond the minimum five votes, Justice Powell
argued that, nevertheless, "I view the trend of our decisions over the past
century as supporting the proposition that artificial entities are treated as
'persons' for purposes of exercising and relying upon constitutional
rights."' 22 The effort did not persuade Justice Rehnquist, who proclaimed
the majority decision as significantly at odds with settled law.
While a corporation's state charter "implicitly guarantees that the
corporation will not be deprived of [its] property absent due process of
law," Justice Rehnquist insisted that it "cannot be so readily concluded
that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the
functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes."l 23 For
him, constitutionally protecting that right for corporations represented a
potential threat to the democratic governance that had created the
corporation: "A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of
potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its efficiency as
an economic entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those
properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in
the political sphere."l24 Thus, more than a decade before Austin, the
future Chief Justice, widely considered the most conservative in
decades,12 articulated that case's essential rationale for preventing
transfer of the corporation's government-provided advantages from the
economic market directly to the marketplace of ideas. Dissenting in
121. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice William H. Rehnquist,
Supreme Court Case File No. 76-1172, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1978) (on file with First
Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee University School of Law).
122. Id.
123. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 825-26.
125. For example, when Chief Justice Rehnquist died in 2005, the first
sentence of his obituary noted that he "helped lead a conservative revolution on the
Supreme Court during 19 years as chief justice of the United States." Linda
Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Is Dead at 80,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at A38.
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Bellotti, he held forth what he articulated as the more deeply established
understanding of the corporate being's standing in law:
So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal
Governments remain open to protect the corporation's
interest in its property, it has no need, though it may
have the desire, to petition the political branches for
similar protection. Indeed, the States might reasonably
fear that the corporation would use its economic power
to obtain further benefits beyond those already
bestowed. 126
That and other indications of the sharp divide among the Justices
who decided Bellotti provide further evidence undermining Justice
Kennedy's Citizens United contention that settled law holds corporate
political media spending as indistinguishable from human political
expression. The Citizens United Court split five-to-four, just as the
Bellotti Court did more than three decades before. Justice Byron R.
White in his dissent rejected the majority opinion just as fully as did
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion: "In short, corporate management
may not use corporate monies to promote what does not further corporate
affairs but what in the last analysis are the purely personal views of the
management, individually or as a group."l2 7
In fact, Justice Powell's papers show that the Bellotti Court
originally came close to an almost unanimous decision to dispose of the
case on drastically narrower grounds and never even consider it in the
manner that ultimately established First Amendment protection for
corporate political media spending. When the Justices met in conference
two days after oral argument in late 1977, eight indicated they would
dispose of the case by reversing the lower court ruling only on the
126. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 826 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 813 (White, J., dissenting).
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128
grounds that the regulation's "materially affecting" provision was
129
unconstitutional, without reaching the First Amendment question.
Justice Brennan was assigned to write a majority opinion on
those lines, but three weeks later informed the other justices that he had
since grown inclined to uphold the Massachusetts regulation, based on
how deeply rooted the Court's jurisprudence and the weight of legislative
action were in the judgment that corporate political media spending
represented a threat to democratic processes. As a member of the
majority the year before in Buckley,' 30 which had struck down federal
campaign expenditure limits on individuals,' 3 1 he said he had concluded
that Buckley would not similarly invalidate the Massachusetts ban on
corporate expenditures in referenda.132 He said at that writing that he did
not know if his view on Bellotti could attract a majority, but warned that
declaring the regulation at issue unconstitutional "must inevitably call
into question the constitutionality of all corrupt practices acts" that had
been enacted over the course of the twentieth century to restrict
"[c]orporate spending as a corrupting influence in the political
process."l33 Similarly, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger noted the same
week he "had begun to have misgivings about the case, particularly on its
potential for undermining the well established Corrupt Practices Act's
128. The Massachusetts Supreme Court had declared constitutional the state
regulation stipulating that "[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning
the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed
materially to affect the property, business or assets or the corporation." First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Att'y Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Mass. 1977) (footnote
omitted).
129. Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell on First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, Supreme Court Case File No. 76-1172, at 1, 3 (Nov. I1, 1977) (on
file with First Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee University School of
Law).
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
131. Id. at 51.
132. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan on First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti to the Conference, Supreme Court Case File No. 76-1172, at 2, 3
(Dec. 1, 1977) (on file with First Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee
University School of Law).
133. Id. at 4.
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limitations."1 34 Beyond the "differences between the First Amendment
rights of an individual as compared with a corporate-collective body"
that he saw, it further concerned the Chief Justice that "[c]orporations
rarely, if ever, consult stockholders on expenditures and indeed a great
many expenditures are made without consulting with the directors, even
though management is accountable to both the directors and
stockholders." 3 5 And he reminded his colleagues that "[m]any of us at
the Conference" in November "expressed concern about taking any step
which would undermine state and federal Corrupt Practices Acts." 36
Those developments led Justice Powell to express interest in
developing an opinion advancing his view that "circumscribing speech
on the basis of its source, in the absence of a compelling interest that
could not be attained otherwise, would be a most serious infringement of
First Amendment rights."' 37 As he and a clerk developed early drafts of
his opinion, they agreed to focus on articulating it "in terms of what is
prohibited rather than who is guaranteed a certain right," acknowledging
that "the Court never has held explicitly that the First Amendment
protects corporate speech to the extent that it protects the speech of
natural persons . .. . ." Ultimately, that thematic strategy resulted in
Bellotti's carefully worded assertion that the bottom line in the case
would not be whether corporations should have the same First
Amendment rights as human beings, but that the "inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
134. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice William J. Brennan,
Supreme Court Case File No. 76-1172, at 1 (Dec. 6, 1977) (on file with First
Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee University School of Law).
135. Id.
136. Id. Ultimately Chief Justice Burger joined the Bellotti majority but
pressed Justice Powell to "underscore the narrowness of the holding" because "[he
did] not want corrupt practices statutes to be placed under a shadow." Letter from
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Supreme Court Case File
No. 76-1172, at 1 (Mar. 11, 1978) (on file with First Amendment Law Review and
Washington & Lee University School of Law).
137. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Supreme Court Case File
No. 76-1172, at 2 (Dec. 1, 1977) (on file with First Amendment Law Review and
Washington & Lee University School of Law).
138. Memorandum from Nancy J. Bregstein to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Supreme Court Case File No. 76-1172, at 2-3 (Sept. 13, 1977) (emphasis added) (on
file with First Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee University School of
Law).
2011] 243
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual."' 39 In that manner, Justice Powell was able to reframe
Bellotti's emphasis from regulation of corporate political media spending
to "the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy." 4 0 But it also meant that the holding clearly would stop
short of stating "that First Amendment protection extends to
141
corporations," as Justice Kennedy contends in Citizens United.
Justice Kennedy also maintains that "Bellotti reaffirmed the First
Amendment principle that the Government cannot restrict political
speech based on the speaker's corporate identity,"' 42 because only a
"single footnote in Bellotti purported to leave open the possibility that
corporate independent expenditures could be shown to cause
corruption."'14 3 The footnote in question declared that the "importance of
the governmental interest in preventing," through corrupt practices
legislation, the "corruption of elected representatives through the
creation of political debts."1 44 Since referenda do not involve candidates,
Bellotti presented "no comparable problem," the footnote continued,
before conceding that
a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different
context of participation in a political campaign for
election to public office. Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent
corruption in independent expenditures by corporations
to influence candidate elections. 145
For Justice Kennedy, that was all no more than irrelevant dicta,
despite the fact that it accompanied text at the beginning of the crucial
section of Justice Powell's opinion in which the government's interests
behind the Massachusetts regulation were considered. 146 Addressing the
139. First Nat'l Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
140. Id.
141. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct.
876, 899 (2010).
142. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 902 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 909 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26).
144. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 786-95.
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question of whether those interests - "sustaining the active role of the
individual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing
diminution of the citizen's confidence in government" and "protecting
the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by
management on behalf of the corporation"' 4 7 - were compelling enough
to "survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed
restriction of freedom of speech" was necessary to the case as decided.148
In the sentence to which the footnote in question is attached, Justice
Powell's opinion critically distinguishes corporate media spending in
referenda from such spending in candidate elections: "However weighty
these interests may be in the context of partisan candidate elections, they
either are not implicated in this case or are not served at all, or in other
than a random manner, by the prohibition."l49
While resolution of one of the requisite elements of the strict-
scrutiny test in a First Amendment case may represent mere dicta for
Justice Kennedy some three decades later, four years after Bellotti,
Justice Rehnquist would ground National Right to Work solidly within
that particular section's affirmation of the enduring primacy of
corruptpractices acts, including citing three times as authority the very
footnote that Justice Kennedy dismisses in Citizens United.150 Indeed, on
the closely divided Bellotti Court, the qualifying language Justice
Kennedy brushes aside may well have been necessary to reach majority
support for Justice Powell's opinion. It is that language that grounds
Bellotti's holding strictly within the specific context of referenda because
a "corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest
implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation
in a political campaign for election to public office."15' Justice Harry A.
Blackmun did not join the opinion until after key language was revised at
his request in the specific passage that Justice Kennedy dismissed as
insignificant. Informing Justice Powell that he was "always bothered and
hesitant" concerning the use of phrases such as "least restrictive
147. Id. at 787.
148. Id. at 786.
149. Id. at 787-88.
150. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
208-10 (1982). In that same passage, Justice Rehnquist declared Bellotti "entirely
consistent with our conclusion here." Id. at 210 n.7.
151. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
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alternative" in relation to declarations by the Court that a state had failed
to utilize such an alternative in advancing interests that implicate the
First Amendment, he expressed concern that Justice Powell's draft, at
that point, did just that.152 "It is so easy, after legislation has been
enacted, and a challenge has come all the way here, to think of
something less restrictive," Justice Blackmun wrote, explaining that he
"would feel much better" if that language would be removed from
Justice Powell's opinion. 153 Justice Powell agreed to the changes, and
Justice Blackmun later provided the fifth vote needed to form a
majority.154 Making the requested change eliminated from the opinion
any assertion that regulation of corporate political media spending in the
future could go no further than the elusive "least restrictive alternative."
Finally, the strength of views contradicting the Bellotti majority
on the Court that decided it are demonstrated by the fact that Justices
Rehnquist and White not only each authored harsh dissents declaring the
majority holding to be at odds with settled law, but both also proceeded
in later years to help form majorities in the series of cases between 1982
and 1990 that emphasized Bellotti's holding was limited to the specific
type of restriction on corporate referenda spending involved in that
case. 155 Justice Rehnquist in particular articulated an extensive rejection
152. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Supreme Court Case File No. 76-1172, at 1 (Mar. 13, 1978) (on file with First
Amendment Law Review and Washington & Lee University School of Law).
153. Id. While Justice Blackmun did not explicitly demand the change for his
vote and arguably could have joined the majority even if the changes were not made,
he did write: "I shall withhold my vote until the new draft promised by your note of
March 10 comes around." Id. Justice Blackmun's position on the breadth of First
Amendment protection for corporate political media spending was tenuous enough
that two years later in Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, he did not
join Justice Powell's majority opinion, authoring a dissent in which he defended the
regulation in that case as constitutional. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 548-56 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26. Specifically, in the text accompanying the
footnote that Justice Kennedy declined to consider significant, the change meant that
rather than asserting that the government's interests in the Massachusetts regulation
"either are not implicated in this case or are not served at all, or in the least
restrictive manner," the final phrase became "or in other than a random manner." Id.
at 788 (emphasis added).
155. See supra notes 55-98 and accompanying text for fuller discussion of that
body of cases.
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of a laissez-faire approach recognizing no distinctions between
corporations and citizens, maintaining that the First Amendment protects
political discussion by and among human - not corporate - beings.156
Whatever regulations might be placed on corporate political spending, he
asserted, "[a]ll natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher
sovereign than the Commonwealth, [will] remain as free as before to
engage in political activity."' 57 He continued to forcefully press the point
through the next decade, writing in his Pacific Gas & Electric dissent,' 58
shortly before being confirmed as Chief Justice, that regulation of
corporate political media spending had nothing to do with the liberty of a
natural person. Extending First Amendment protection to corporations
based on "individual freedom of conscience . . . strains the rationale ...
beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an
'intellect' or 'mind' . . . is to confuse metaphor with reality," he
wrote. 159
CONCLUSION
Thus, my years of work on this area of law leads me to conclude
that - for the reasons detailed above and for those in additional
scholarship by myself and others - there is overwhelming theoretical
and historical evidence that Citizens United was very wrongly decided.
The body of enduring wisdom against such expansive First Amendment
protection for corporate political media spending is simply too great -
if we want to preserve a democracy of the people. That wisdom was
articulated with particularly compelling force in the "Other People's
Money" cases that the Citizens United majority disregards. Thus, in
short, the legitimate answers to the questions presented at the beginning
of this article are, respectively: (1) Hillary: The Movie always was
protected expression and certainly was never banned - because it was
only the corruptive spending of other people's money from advantaged
corporate treasuries that was not protected; and (2) associations that
156. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. 475 U.S. 1, 26-35 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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spend their members' money rather than other people's provided by
corporate managers were already fully protected long before Citizens
United.
To toss aside all that, as I contend the Citizens United majority
has done, requires embracing its interpretation of marketplace-of-ideas
doctrine as rendering historical corrupt-practices concerns irrelevant, its
speaker-neutrality conceptualization equating corporate political media
spending with human expression, and its creative characterization of
significant precedents as trivial. Doing so quite arguably also means
accepting an oligarchic understanding of democracy and freedom of
expression in which huge, powerful corporate institutions dominate the
political marketplace of ideas and the role of most citizens is greatly
diminished. Such a sweeping institutionalization of the objectives of the
corporate free-speech movement represents a transformation of the
quality of democratic decisionmaking that trends away from a
sovereignty of the many toward a sovereignty of the few.160
For the future, we cannot know for sure whether the Citizens
United precedent will be respected by future courts more than its
majority respected the precedents of past courts. At this point, however,
with this majority, by all evidence, firmly in place at the Court for some
time to come, it appears that the most hopeful opportunities to avoid a
sovereignty of the few lie in greatly expanded disclosure requirements.
Too often, corporate political media spending is conducted "behind
dubious and misleading names like: 'The Coalition - Americans
Working for Real Change' (funded by business organizations opposed to
organized labor), 'Citizens for Better Medicare' (funded by the
pharmaceutical industry)...."1 In the only element of Citizens United
that did not split the Court down the middle, eight justices firmly
160. See KERR, supra note 8, at 1-18.
161. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia declared:
"Given these tactics, Plaintiffs never satisfactorily answer the question of how
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech can occur when organizations hide
themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public." Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), in response to corporate plaintiffs invoking the
same phrase in their challenge to regulation of corporate political media spending).
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supported that sort of regulation.162 "Even if the ads only pertain to a
commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is
speaking about a candidate shortly before an election," Justice
Kennedy's opinion declared.' 63
Ideally, that would include regulation that requires corporate
managers to notify their stockholders in advance of such spending when
they intend to use company profits on expenditures for political
candidates - a form of disclosure quite specifically endorsed in Justice
Kennedy's Citizens United opinion:
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with
the information needed to hold corporations and elected
officials accountable for their positions and supporters.
Shareholders can determine whether their corporation's
political speech advances the corporation's interest in
making profits, and citizens can see whether elected
officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed interests
. . . . [D]isclosure permits citizens and shareholders to
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.
This transparency enables the electorate to make
informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.164
Even more ideally, given all that, it seems justified to also
consider legislation that would provide stockholders with rights similar
165
to corporate rights that the Court protected in Pacific Gas & Electric.
If political media spending is protected First Amendment expression,
then surely spending someone else's money for such purposes must be
considered an unconstitutional act of forcing the owners of the money to
associate with viewpoints with which they may not agree. After all,
protecting corporate speakers from such compelled association was
precisely what the Court established in Pacific Gas & Electric. If the
current majority truly holds that no distinction can be made in First
162. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct.
876, 913-16 (2010). Only Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from that holding.
163. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 915.
164. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 916 (citations omitted).
165. 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (protecting corporate expression from
compelled association with the viewpoints of other speakers).
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Amendment law between political speakers, should it not also protect
stockholders from such compelled association? For as long as that
majority remains in place, such protection seems to offer the only
remaining hope for reviving the enduring wisdom of the "Other People's
Money" holdings in the Court's jurisprudence on corporate political
media spending.
